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One of the most important aspects of
consumer payment systems in the
United States is the widespread use
of credit cards. American consumers
use credit cards to pay for about one,
fifth of their purchases each year.
That pattern of use is not universal.

- BY RONALD J.

MANN

The fallowing essay is excerpted from a
paper prepared during fall 2000 during
the author~ stay in Tokyo as a visiting
scholar at the Institute for Monetary and
Economic Studies at the Bank ofJapan.
More details and the longer
version of the paper are available
via two Web sites:

Consumers in other countries use cards to
pay for purchases much less frequently statistics from the Bank of International
Settlements suggest about 62 card-based
payment transactions per person per year
in the United States, but many fewer such
transactions in other countries. For
example, Japan's economy has only four
such transactions per person per year. The
question has important policy ramifications
both because of the benefits of card-based
payment systems (low-cost payments that
enhance the efficiency of the retail sector of

http://www-personal.umich.edu/-rmann/credit%20 cards.htm
and http://www-personal.umich.edu/-rmann/japan.htm
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the economy), and also because of the
problems that come with them including the likelihood that the high rate
of credit-card use in this country is related
to this country's high rate of consumer
bankruptcy - the highest of any
industrialized country.
The question naturally arises whether
there is something about the card that is
uniquely attractive to certain types of
consumer personalities - perhaps the
relatively profligate and confident
consumers of the United States - so that
credit cards are more attractive in some
countries and less attractive in those
populated by consumers of a more
cautious and prudent inclination. Or,
alternatively, is the relative use of credit
cards driven by aspects of the institutional
backgrounds of particular countries that
make cards more useful and effective in
some countries than others.
This paper attempts to explore the latter
alternative. I argue that the success of
credit cards in different countries generally
can be explained for the most part by the
institutional background of the countries in
question. Specifically, I identify three
institutional factors associated with the
growth of credit cards:
■ A regulatory environment that
permits free participation by banks in the
credit-card market (because depositary
institutions are best-placed to develop
card-based payment products)
■ Low telecommunication costs
(because low telecommunication costs
foster an effective anti-fraud system)
■ The size of the national retail
economy (because of economies of scale in
implementing technological improvements
to the system).
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PATTERNS OF USAGE
In the market for retail purchases in the
United States, the credit card is a massive
success: it was used in 1998 for 14 billion
transactions worth almost $1.1 trillion
dollars, about $76 per transaction.
Department of Commerce statistics indicate
that in 1998 credit cards were used in
about 17 percent of all transactions, for
about 21 percent of the value paid in all
American payment transactions. For the
most part, those transactions were
conducted as revolving-credit transactions.
Under American practices, that means that
the cardholder decides each month what
share of the total account balance it will
pay back; the cardholder is required to
make only a tiny minimal payment, in an
amount that often would not amortize the
entire balance for several years. In practice,
somewhat more than half of American
cardholders take advantage of that option
to defer payment of some or all of their
credit-card account balance each month.
The payments that they do make are made
for the most part by writing a check and
mailing it to the issuer.
The contrast with Japan is considerable.
First, Japanese consumers plainly do not
use cards as frequently as American
consumers: One recent study, for example,
indicated that even excluding cash
transactions (by all accounts the dominant
method of point-of-sale payment in Japan),
credit cards accounted for only 10 percent
of the value of payment transactions.
Industry statistics indicate only ¥20.76
trillion of credit-card transactions in 1999,
about 5 percent of the ¥400 trillion of
Japanese consumer spending last year. That
reflects purchases of about $1500 per
capita, compared to about $3500 per capita
in the United States. As you would expect
given the larger role of cash payments in
Japan, the average credit-card transaction is
much larger in Japan than it is in the
United States, in the range of ¥25,000
(about $225).
Perhaps the most important feature of
the Japanese transactions is the limited
extent to which they involve credit. The
overwhelming majority - 80 percent or

more - of Japanese credit-card
transactions are settled by ikkai barai
(which means something like "payment in
one cycle"). Under ikkai barai , the
consumer agrees (at the point of purchase)
that the transaction will be paid to the
issuer in full on the next monthly payment
date.
The full implications of ikkai barai for
the credit-card system come from its
interaction with the general absence of the
check from the Japanese consumer
payment system. The ordinary Japanese
consumer pays bills by a credit transfer or
a prearranged debit transfer (similar to the
automated clearinghouse transactions
American consumers often use to pay
mortgages or other regularly recurring
bills). Thus, in the credit-card transaction,
the customer's consent to ikkai barai
amounts not only to a general commitment
to pay in one month - analogous to the
American cardholders general commitment
when it signs a credit-card slip that it will
repay "in accordance with the agreement
with the card issuer." The consent to ikkai
barai also includes an authorization for a
transfer out of the customer's account to
pay the transaction shortly after the last
day of the payment cycle. Because the
cardholder at the point of purchase already
has given the issuer access to a specified
amount of funds in a specified account, the
transaction resembles much more closely
an American debit-card transaction than an
American credit-card transaction.
After the end of each payment cycle, the
issuer sends the cardholder a statement
summarizing the charges. Absent an
affirmative and timely objection by the
cardholder, the issuer causes the funds to
be transferred from the cardholder's bank
account to the issuer's account on the

designated date. When the cardholder uses

ikkai barai, there typically is no interest or
other charge for the deferral of payment
from the date of the transaction to the
monthly payment date. Thus, the 80
percent (or greater) share of transactions
processed by ikkai barai involves no
significant extension of credit by the issuer.

EXPLAINING
THE DIFFERENCES
It is not difficult to accept the limited
extent to which credit cards have caught
on as a consumer payment system in
Japan. Among other things, there is the
strong reliance on cash by Japanese
consumers, which leaves a relatively small
noncash payment-systems market for credit
cards. Also, although Japan's economy is
one of the largest in the world, it is
somewhat smaller than the United States',
which gives Japan marginally less access to
the economies of scale in deployment of
technology to facilitate effective card
systems.
It is much more difficult, however, to
understand why Japanese cardholders
borrow so rarely even when they do use
the cards. The most obvious explanation is
the simplest, but also the least satisfying:
Japanese cardholders by nature are more
cautious, and averse to borrowing, than
American consumers. Thus, you might
think that it is natural that they should use
credit less. That habit could be connected
to the substantial literature attempting to
explain what seems to be the higher
predilection to save of the individual
Japanese consumer. From that perspective,
the other side of a higher predilection for
savings would be a lower tendency to use
consumer credit. If the analysis starts from
that point, it should be no surprise that the
Japanese consumer credit market as a
whole is much smaller per capita than the
American consumer credit market. The
American consumer credit market is now
in the range of $1.2 trillion (about $4,400
per capita). The Japanese market is much
smaller, about ¥30 trillion (about $2,200
per person).

It probably would be an exaggeration to
deny that explanation entirely. It does,
however, have a number of obvious
problems. The first is that much of the
academic literature explains the higher
savings rate not as a special aspect of the
Japanese personality, but instead as a result
of other institutional features of the
Japanese economy. For example, some
scholars think the higher rate of savings is
caused by the Japanese system for
intergenerational transfers of wealth, while
others view it (even now) as an artifact of
Japan's stage of industrial development.
Although those explanations would explain
a lower rate of consumer spending, they
provide much less direct support for the
lower rate of consumer borrowing that
appears in the credit-card market.
Specifically, they provide little support for
the specific observation in question: a
lower rate of borrowing in those
transactions in which consumers choose to
purchase by credit card.
To explain that pattern, it seems more
useful to look to the specific history and
structure of the Japanese credit-card
market. Perhaps the most obvious thing
about the structure of the market is the
strong role that nonbank issuers play in
that market. In the United States, cards
issued by banks account for almost twothirds of the market: Visa has about
38 percent of the market and MasterCard
about 21 percent of the market. In Japan,
by contrast, the role of the banks is quite a
bit more limited. As of 1998, cards issued
by companies affiliated with banks were
responsible for only about 49 percent of
Japanese credit-card shopping. Cards
issued by retailers accounted for another
29 percent; cards issued by shinpan kaisha
(a non-bank type of credit-sales company)
for another 17 percent. Those numbers
might not seem so different from the
American numbers, but they obscure a
more fundamental point: the limited role

It is much more difficult, however, to
understand why Japanese cardholders
borrow so rarely even when they do
use the cards. The most obvious
explanation is the simplest, but also
the least satisfying: Japanese
cardholders by nature are more
cautious, and averse to borrowing,
than American consumers. Thus,
you might think that it is natural
that they should use credit less.
That habit could be connected to the
substantial literature attempting to
explain what seems to be the higher
predilection to save of the individual
Japanese consumer.
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bank-affiliated issuers play with respect to
credit; bank-affiliated issuers had only 13
percent of the extended borrowing (kappu)
done by credit cards.
The limited role of banks in the creditcard system surely is related in a general
way to the limited attention that banks in
Japan have devoted to consumer finance.
Even now, notwithstanding the financial
pressures that have confronted the
Japanese banking industry in the late
1990s, it is not clear that Japanese banks
have turned wholeheartedly to consumer
finance.
But the relatively limited bank role in
the credit-card market in particular has a
more specific explanation: a long (and notyet-ended) history of regulatory exclusion
from the market. Given the success that
American banks have had in the creditcard market, it is surprising to learn of the
tradition limiting the participation of
Japanese banks and their affiliates in that
market. The precise reason for the
exclusion is not entirely clear. Mark
Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth argue
that the exclusion generally was designed
to protect smaller credit companies that
would have suffered from competition with
the banks. At least in part, at some times,
however, it also seems to have been
designed to protect retailers as well.
In any event, for whatever reason, banks
(but not their affiliates) were entirely
barred from issuing credit cards until 1982.
Not until 1992 were banks or their
affiliates permitted to issue cards that
allowed revolving credit. And not until this
year have Japanese banks and their
affiliates been permitted to issue cards that
include a variety of other borrowing
options typical of the industry.
To be sure, the exclusion of banks from
the credit-card market does not necessarily
preclude the development of a market for
credit-card lending. Nevertheless, as
explained above, the development of the
industry in the United States does suggest
that Japan's long exclusion of banks from
the market can explain much of the limited
use of credit in the credit-card market. One
way to look at the Japanese card market with its ikkai barai-dominated payment
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structure - is to view it as just starting to
move beyond the payment cards that
populated the American market in the
1950s and 1960s. It is not a coincidence
that the credit card first introduced in
Japan (in 1960) was modeled directly on
the American Express and Diner's Club
payment cards. Without banks in the
marketplace, the industry has for the most
part been static since that time: the
products available to consumers have not
been sufficiently attractive to produce the
consumer reaction visible in the United
States.
This is seen most clearly in the
institution of revolving credit, which is so
strangely missing from the Japanese creditcard market. At least part of the answer
must be the relatively unattractive features
of that product as it exists in Japan.
Specifically, "revolving" credit in Japan does
not permit the freely chosen, month-tomonth varying payments typical of the
American cardholder. Rather, the
cardholder agrees, at the time that the card
is issued, that any transactions designated
as "revolving" will be paid back over a
prearranged schedule (perhaps 10 percent
per month, perhaps ¥10,000 per month).
The product is designed in that
cumbersome way for a reason: in the
absence of checks, it is much less practical
for the Japanese cardholder to make the
odd-amount monthly payments than it is
for the American cardholder who normally
pays by check. But despite that practical
cause for the payment method, the fact
remains that the so-called revolving credit
traditionally offered to Japanese consumers
is not nearly as convenient as the product
available in the United States.
Still, it is difficult to understand why the
non-bank players in the credit-card
industry have not stepped into the void to
provide the seductive products that
American banks have designed to facilitate
the profitable extension of so much
consumer credit in the United States. It is

clear that the major players are aware of
the profitability of revolving credit; most of
them have simply failed in their efforts to
persuade their customers to use it. My
answer is the one suggested above, that
banks are best-placed to develop creditcard products that facilitate large amounts
of borrowing. The exclusion of banks from
the Japanese market during the period that
those products were developed in the
United States - when depositary relations
seemed to be crucial to successful creditcard issuance - stifled development of
those products until the last few years.
The plausibility of that analysis is
bolstered by a significant recent innovation
in the Japanese credit-card market: the
1999 introduction by at least one
consumer-finance company of a credit card
that offers the type of revolving credit that
has been so successful in the United States.
The identity of the issuer - a consumer
finance company not affiliated with any

Still, it is difficult to understand
why the non-bank players in the
credit-card industry have not
stepped into the void to provide the
seductive products that American
banks have designed to facilitate
the profitable extension of so much
consumer credit in the
United States.

depositary institution - suggests that the
same developments in information
technology that foster successful credit-card
lending by American monoline banks with no depositary relations with their
customers - have shown the way to
similar products in Japan.
As you would expect, based on the
American market experience, the product
seems to be successful, at least initially, in
attracting customers; the company has
issued more than 500,000 cards in the first
18 months of the program (more than a
third of them to customers with no
previous relationship with the lender). For

present purposes, the most important thing
about the program is that those customers
are selecting revolving credit for a
staggering (for Japan) 91 percent of their
purchases. The companys underwriting
relies heavily on a credit-scoring model, an
approach that seems to resemble closely
the models used by American issuers. The
use of this technology is particularly
surprising given the relatively limited
availability in the Japanese consumerfinance industry of consumer financial
information.
Perhaps the most persuasive point
supporting the importance of the exclusion
of banks is the recent history of the credit
card in Japan, which in the last few years
(since bank-affiliated issuers were
permitted to issue cards with revolving
credit) has displayed a marked
convergence with the American pattern of
usage. First, Japanese use of credit cards
almost doubled between 1994 and 1998
LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES SPRING
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(from 362.8 million transactions to 720.7
million transactions). Interestingly, the
amount of the transactions rose by only
about 40 percent (from ¥12 .5 trillion to
¥17.8 trillion), which resulted in a decrease
of the average transaction by about 28
percent (from almost ¥34,500 to just under
¥25,000) - still much larger than
American transactions, but apparently
dropping, as the credit card seems to
displace a larger and larger share of cash
transactions.
Second, on the specific point of
relevance - the use of borrowing with
credit cards - it is clear that the gross
amount of borrowing is increasing (by 19
percent in the last three years), and that the
share of borrowing among bank-affiliated
credit-card transactions is growing
particularly rapidly (by 74 percent in the
last three years). It would be imprudent to
give much weight to evidence of a
macroeconomic trend appearing over such
a short period of time - less than an
entire economic cycle - but if the trend
continues, it would move Japanese usage
patterns closer to those in the United
States: with more transactions, of a
significantly smaller amount, and with
more frequent borrowing.
To summarize, it may be that part of the
difference in the use of credit in credit-card
transactions arises from something different
about the "taste" of the Japanese cardholder
for borrowing, but a substantial part of the
difference also must be attributable to
differences in the institutional framework
within which the card has developed, and
in which it is used.

THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE SYSTEM
It is fair to wonder whether the same
circumstances that have limited the use of
credit in the Japanese credit-card industry
have undermined the effectiveness of the
system. The question is particularly
important, because a first glance at the
Japanese system suggests that it does quite
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a poor job. At least compared to the
American system, the Japanese system is
relatively expensive to the merchant who
takes the card and also endures relatively
high losses from fraud. In both cases,
however, a closer look at the systems
suggests that the raw differences in the
statistics overstate the severity of these
problems. Both problems are related to the
limited use of credit and thus, like that
phenomenon, do not seem to be long-term
aspects of the system.
In assessing the cost of a payment
system, the most relevant cost is the cost to
the end-users, the parties to the payment
transaction. For a credit card, the simplest
indicator of that cost is the discount fee
that a merchant pays when obtaining funds
for the transaction from the card system.
For the Visa and MasterCard credit-card
systems that dominate the United States
market, the discount fee varies widely
depending on the type of merchant, but
normally ranges between 1.5 to 5 percent,
with most merchants seeming to pay
something less than two percent. The
discount fee for American Express (the
largest competitor) is about 2. 75 percent.
Although it is difficult to get specific
information, the discount rates in Japan
seem to be somewhat higher. Published
sources suggest that rates often are above
5 percent, but in fact rates seem to be quite
a bit lower. Based on my interviews, my
impression is that a typical rate is more
commonly in the vicinity of 3 - 3.5 percent.
The most persuasive explanation for the
higher discount fees is the paucity of credit
transactions. In the United States, creditcard issuers rely heavily on revenue from
interest that their cardholders pay on
borrowed funds . Thus, they can operate
profitably with a relatively smaller reliance
on revenue from the merchant. For
example, credit-card issuers in the United
States derive 88 percent of their revenues
from finance charges (including late fees),
and only 10 percent from interchange fees .
In Japan, revenues from interest are a
relatively small portion of the revenues of
the card issuer, about 23 percent over the
industry as a whole, but only 14 percent of
the revenues of bank-affiliated card issuers.
Thus, the issuers operations can be
profitable only if it obtains a relatively

higher share of revenue from the merchant
and the cardholder. In Japan those fees
amount to 77 percent of all industry
revenues, but 86 percent of the revenues of
bank-affiliated issuers. And in fact, the
apparent discount rates of 3 - 4 percent are
not out of line if they are compared to the
rates that American Express charges for its
payment card rather than the rates Visa and
MasterCard charge for their credit cards.
Because American Express faces the same
lack of interest income that Japanese
issuers do, its discount rates provide a
more appropriate benchmark for comparison.
To be sure, the discount rates do appear
to be cognizably higher than those that
American Express charges in the United
States. But several structural explanations
make that slight difference readily
understandable. Most obviously, a
merchants selection of an acquirer in the
United States occurs in a relatively
competitive market characterized by a
small number of clearing networks with a
large number of potential acquirers in each
network. Thus, in the United States, a
typical merchant can gain access to the
Visa and MasterCard systems from any of
literally dozens of banks, as well as a large
number of sophisticated third-party
acquirers. First Data surely has a
dominating share of the market (more than
40 percent), but there are such a large
number of competitors of significant size
that the market is relatively competitive, in
the sense that there is extensive intra-brand
competition notwithstanding the limited
inter-brand competition. And even if
American Express is the sole way for a
merchant to get access to its cardholders,
history shows that the rates that American
Express can charge are affected by the rates
that the larger Visa and MasterCard
systems charge.
In Japan, by contrast, a merchant
wishing to accept credit cards is confronted
with a market featuring a large number of
clearance networks with a relatively small
number of potential acquirers in each
market. Most merchants who accept credit
cards find it necessary to make arrangements with several of the large Japanese
systems, because most of those systems
clear and process their own transactions:

a typical merchant might accept a dozen or
more different cards and some accept as
many as 25. Thus, for each of those
systems, the merchant faces a single system
operator with whom it must reach an
agreement. It should be no surprise if the
charges in that market were higher than
they are in the United States.
On the other hand, that problem should
be mitigated in the next few years, with the
increasing tendency of all of the Japanese
systems to issue cards with the Visa and
MasterCard brand; cards with those brands
can be cleared through any entity that is a
member of those networks. If competition
among members of those networks lowers
the rates for acquisition of transactions of
those brands, the large market presence of
those brands should put pressure on the
discount rates for other brands in Japan
just as it has in the United States.
One last explanation for the higher
discount rates is the relatively small size of
the Japanese system. If discount rates are
affected by economies of scale in the
development and use of information
technology, as I believe, then it would be
natural for the Japanese system - in
which fewer consumers use their cards less
frequently - to be somewhat more
expensive per transaction than the
American system. That explanation does
not necessarily suggest a long-term
difference, but it does support a pattern in
which Japanese rates tended to lag above
slowly decreasing American rates. Although
the information that I have is sketchy, this
seems to be the case: Industry observers
and executives believe that the rates have
been dropping already during the last few
years. Thus, higher discount rates seem
unlikely to be a long-term problem for the
system.
Another feature important to the
effectiveness of a payment system is
reliability: how well does it prevent
unauthorized transactions? On that point,
again, the raw data suggests that Japan has
a problem. Specifically, the fraud rate in the

That problem should be mitigated in
the next few years, with the
increasing tendency of all of the
Japanese systems to issue cards with
the Visa and MasterCard brand; cards
with those brands can be cleared
through any entity that is a member
of those networks. If competition
among members of those networks
lowers the rates for acquisition of
transactions of those brands, the large
market presence of those brands
should put pressure on the discount
rates for other brands in Japan just as
it has in the United States.
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United States is about 0.06 percent (six
cents per $100). In Japan, by contrast, the
fraud rate was much higher, about ¥0.13
per ¥100 - ¥27 billion last year in losses
from fraud, of which ¥9 billion was from
forged credit cards. The much larger
United States system had only $155
million in losses from forged cards.
looking specifically to losses from forged
cards, the Japanese rate of about 4 .3 basis
points is about three times the American
rate of 1.3 basis points.
One possibility I initially considered was
that the high fraud is associated with the
diminished statutory incentive for Japanese
card issuers to prevent unauthorized
transactions. Under the Truth-in-lending
Act, American issuers are barred by law
from shifting the risk of unauthorized
transactions to their cardholders; Japanese
issuers face no such constraint. It is
possible, then, that the difference in legal
treatment could lead to a lower level of
care by the card issuer. On reflection,
however, that explanation does not seem
plausible. For one thing, Japanese issuers
in practice retain the risk of unauthorized
transactions, because they purchase
insurance for much of that risk and
voluntarily cover most of the losses that the
insurance does not cover. Because they
purchase that insurance from third-party
insurers, it is fair to expect that the rates
that they pay in the long run are affected
substantially by their performance.
Moreover, it is clear that the fraud rates
in both countries are not stable, as you
would expect if the rates were associated
with differences in the legal framework. In
the United States, for example, the fraud
rate has fallen by more than half in the last
decade . Similarly, the fraud problem in
Japan is relatively recent; fraud losses in
1999 were 45 percent higher than they
were just two years earlier in 1997, with 94
percent of the increase attributable to losses
from forged cards.
It is more plausible to attribute the
losses to exploitation of short-term
vulnerabilities in the Japanese system. Most
obviously, the Japanese system uses
contemporaneous telephone authorizations
much less frequently than the American
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system, apparently because of the relatively
high cost of Japanese telecommunications.
Without those authorizations, the potential
for fraud is much higher, because the
system has no practical way to identify a
card that bears a valid number, even if the
magnetic stripe fails to include the
information that would appear on a
legitimate card.
But it is most implausible to regard that
difficulty as a permanent feature of the
system. It is unlikely that Japanese issuers
and merchants will tolerate for long
substantial losses from fraud that easily
could be eradicated by simple
authorization procedures that are standard
operating practice in the United States.
Thus, it is not surprising that the industry
already is implementing responses that
target that problem: industry sources
explain that as of late 2000 or 2001 most
department stores and hotels in Japan will
process transactions without any floor at all
- seeking online authorizations for all
transactions regardless of size. Another
response that seems to be appearing in the
market already is an increasing tendency
for large store-related issuers to adopt the
Visa and MasterCard brands. Use of those
brands gives the issuers access to all of the
anti-fraud technology that has been
effective in the United States.
But no technological advance can solve
the problem entirely Even contemporaneous
authorizations are to some degree
vulnerable to sophisticated cards created by
skimmers (who obtain not only the cardaccount number, but also the other
information on the magnetic stripe of the
legitimate card). The only existing defense
against those cards is the relatively
vulnerable capacity of issuer-based expert
computer systems to detect questionable
patterns in the usage of cards. And to some
degree, Japan's high fraud rate is caused by
two unfortunate features that make it a
likely target for such attacks the high
telecommunication costs that continue to
deter merchants from consistent
authorization of transactions and its
proximity to the Asian locations where the
most sophisticated card forgers seem to
reside . To the extent those features are
ineradicable, the Japanese credit-card
industry will continue to endure fraud

losses somewhat higher than those in the
United States.
In the end , the two systems operate
quite differently, in markets of different
sizes with different constraints on the
players, facing a customer base that
arguably has a significantly different taste
for the credit card. Thus, I finish my
analysis not the least bit surprised by the
many differences in the way the cards
function in the two countries. If anything,
it is surprising that the results are
converging as rapidly as they are.
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